T he promise to bo os t trans-Atlantic economic exchange in the world's largest free-trade area came along with the aim to "include investment… protection provisions based on the… highest standards of protection that both sides have negotiated to date". This mandate for the EU negotiators is in line with that defined previously by the EU member states for the negotiations of a Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada, as well as for trade agreements Singapore and India, all of which shall provide for "the highest possible level of legal protection and certainty for European investors … built upon the Member States' experience and best practices regarding their bilateral investment treaties". Indeed, with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, it is now for the European Union to legislate on foreign direct investments and therefore also to substitute the 1,500 or so bilateral investment treaties that the EU Member States have concluded so far with uniform EU agreements with third countries.
These bilateral investment treaties (BITs) are mostly modelled after an OECD blueprint whose origin dates back to 1952. They provide very basic and rather simplistic provisions on investment protection standards, such as national treatment and nondiscrimination, fair and equitable treatment and a prohibition on expropriation without adequate compensation. Most notably, the vast majority of these BITs grant foreign investors direct rights of action for damages against their host state before international arbitral tribunals when they feel that the host state has not respected the rights accepted in the BIT. As for their bilateral or reciprocal character, already F.A. Mann noted in 1981 that it was "rather a matter of prestige … than reality." The reality is that no such BIT has ever been concluded between two "first world" countries. So far the clear assumption has been that these treaties would provide for protection to investors from traditional capital exporting countries doing business in countries with poor rule of law records -and poor altogether. In 1965 the World Bank sponsored a multilateral convention for e s t a b l i s h i n g a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l framework for these investor-statearbitrations with the official aim to provide for sufficient legal certainty so that investors would not be put off by "political risk" in developing countries, and so as to help these countries to develop.
How, then, does this developmentled approach square with a deal between the world's two most developed economic blocks? Given the huge size of US investments in Europe and the litigious attitude of US firms and especially law firms, considerable fears have emerged concerning the dangers that such unchecked investor-state arbitration might entail for our own policy space. George Monbiot has polemicized in The Guardian that TTIP, with its investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions, would be a "fullfrontal assault on democracy", pointing to Philip Morris' claim for billions against Australia after its Parliament passed plain packaging legislation, and to Eli Lilly's halfa-billion dollar claim against Canada after Canadian federal courts had invalidated some of the US company's pharmaceutical's patents. International law luminary Martti Koskenniemi, the current LSE Centennial Professor in Law, has warned that the ISDS provisions in TTIP would be "a transfer of power from public authorities to an arbitration body, where a handful of people would be able to rule whether a country can enact a law or not and how the law must be interpreted". Koskenniemi points not only to Philip Morris' claim, but also to the multi-billion claim by the Swedish energy company Vattenfall against Germany for its accelerated phasing out of nuclear power after Fukoshima, based on the Energy Charter Treaty (which was hardly designed for investment in the EU Internal Market). More recently, the French Minister of Foreign Trade has expressed France's opposition to the inclusion of ISDS in TTIP, echoing fears that US investors could challenge French anti-fracking laws. A rather clear "Nein" also has come from the German Minister of Economy, reiterated recently also for CETA. In a debate in the UK House of Commons, a backbencher for the Conservative Party, Zac Goldsmith, has asked his government: "Why do we need these tribunals for a country where the rule of law is adhered to, more or less across the board?" And the House of Lords has most recently concluded that "proponents of investment protection provisions enforced by an ISDS mechanism have yet to make a compelling case for their inclusion in TTIP or to convincingly dispel public concerns".
Many of these concerns may, in part, be less objective than one would like the political debate to be. But they do carry some weight, not only because the reasons given by the EU Commission so far for a supposed need of including ISDS are weak and almost self-defeating, as I have tried to show in a separate policy paper. What is more, as rightly pointed out by the HoL, "ISDS provisions are in themselves only an enforcement m e c h a n i s m : t h e s u b s t a n t i v e protections afforded to foreign investors in the investment chapter of a TTIP agreement would matter most". The Commission itself has acknowledged that "the decisions of arbitral tribunals are only as good as the provisions that they have to interpret and apply". This was also my point in a report written for the EU Parliament in December 2012, recently published with modifications in the International and Comparative Law Quarterly. There I tried to show how future EU investment agreements would, if framed along the lines of existing BITs and without proper safeguards, fundamentally change the current law of the Union as regards state liability, especially for legislative acts. Foreign investors in the EU would be able to obtain monetary compensation for legislative policy decisions that might be perfectly l e g a l u n d e r E U l a w b u t a re nevertheless found by an arbitral tribunal to be non-compliant with the standards of a EU investment agreement. This is true despite the fact that the European Court of Justice, on the basis of the principles common to most Member States, has limited the Union's liability for damages to private parties precisely with the aim of shielding the democratic policy making process from the risk of "regulatory chill". 
